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Rulers of weak states face a predicament. They lack capacity to monitor crime and need citizens to 
partake in intelligence-sharing. Yet, agents of such authorities are seldom trusted, raising doubts about 
whether locals will provide information. The case of wildlife poaching in African countries illustrates 
this tension, where rangers are few and offenders on good terms with locals. Why do some locals choose 
to assist rangers and report on poachers, while others refrain from doing so? We surveyed 2300 residents 
in and near the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. We 
find that people that are afraid of rangers and perceive them as corruptible are less willing to assist in 
information-sharing. Seeing poaching as condemnable also matters. In contrast, individuals’ stakes in 
conservation and perceptions of wildlife as threatened do not predict our outcome. For effective com-
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Rulers of all states face a shared predicament: they lack the resources and administrative capacity needed 
to completely monitor law compliance. Although there is great variation in these resources and capaci-
ties, they typically need some help from citizens in order to access information about crime in their 
communities. Yet, at the same time, agents of the authorities are also trusted by locals to a varying degree, 
questioning whether people will partake in such intelligence-sharing. These problems are especially pre-
sent in so called weak states, where rulers are particularly short in resources and authorities enjoy low 
level of trust. The case of wildlife poaching in African countries clearly illustrates this tension: the mon-
itoring capacity is low and the officials are few, enabling large-scale illegal hunting. In addition, offenders 
are often on good terms with locals, who sometimes even benefit from criminal acts themselves. 
Taking this predicament as a starting point, we ask: Why do some locals choose to assist rangers and 
report on poachers, while others refrain from doing so? To answer this query, the aim of this article is 
to develop and test a number of hypotheses associated with citizens’ willingness to share crucial infor-
mation about illegal activities with state officials. The empirical investigation focuses specifically on 
poaching of wildlife in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) in Mozambique, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe. We analyze an original survey of about 2300 residents living in and near the GLTP.  
Apart from providing empirical insights, the paper contributes theoretically to the literature on state 
capacity. State capacity is often defined as “a government’s ability to make and enforce rules” (Fukuyama 
2013, 350). Yet, fostering and sustaining such capacity requires information of some sort (Brambor et al. 
2019). Investigating residents’ willingness to report suspicious activities, and, consequently, the ability of 
states to gain critical information about the “goings-on at the local level” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80) 
can hence be conceived of as speaking directly to our understanding of how to foster and sustain social 
control and state capacity (Hendrix 2010). Given the trend in governance the last decades of an increased 
use of community-policing in a range of illegal activities, understanding these processes is highly relevant.  
 
2. Theory 
Administrative capacity and policing in the hinterlands 
State capacity as a concept has been defined in many different ways. For example, Hendrix (2010) dis-
tinguishes between those that emphasize (1) military capacity, (2) bureaucratic administrative capacity 
and (3) the quality and coherence of political institutions. What the different definitions have in common, 
however, is that they are closely related to what Mann has called infrastructural power. This is defined 
as “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political 
decisions throughout the realm” (1986, 113). This is typically treated as “the capacities to penetrate so-
ciety, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined 
ways” (Migdal 1988, 4-5). One of the most important assets for the state to be able to fulfill these tasks, 
e.g., to ‘exercise control’ or ‘implement decisions throughout the realm’, is in turn information (Brambor 






A state’s successful ability to achieve constituent cooperation tend to depend on the means of social 
control (Fukuyama 2013). In turn, the means used to foster constituent cooperation can predominantly 
emphasize either coercion and the ambition to deter people from noncompliance, or a more cooperative 
approach trying to encourage consent and compliance through inclusiveness and participation (North 
2006). While coercive approaches on the one hand rest on the state’s monopoly of violence and its 
repressive apparatus, cooperative strategies on the other hand strive for the devolution of power and for 
a high level of citizen participation in decision-making (Sjöstedt and Linell 2021). A similar distinction is 
found in the broader literature on compliance, which derives constituent cooperation either from deter-
rence and the perceived costs and benefits from deviating from state-imposed rules, or from perceptions 
of inclusiveness, legitimacy, and fairness motivating individuals to comply (Ostrom 1990). 
These different strategies might, however, work best in tandem. Jackman (1993) argues that relying only 
on coercion and the use of force in fact is an indicator of the state’s inability to induce compliance by 
other non-coercive means. The exercise of state power is hence far more than the use of force and 
instead relies on legitimacy, an outcome where “most citizens have a predisposition to regard compliance 
with the officers of those institutions as appropriate and reasonable” and “compliance thus becomes a 
habit” (Jackman 1993, 40). Strategies relying solely on the voluntary cooperation of citizens may, how-
ever, be naïve in terms of expecting cooperation from citizens, and may suffer from severe collective 
action problems associated with freeriding. The most effective way for the state to achieve constituent 
cooperation may instead be to strive for so called semi- or quasi-voluntary compliance, i.e., compliance 
motivated by a willingness to cooperate but backed by coercion (Levi 1997).  
Achieving compliance and constituent cooperation has been shown to be particularly difficult in an Af-
rican context (Herbst 2000). Throughout history, African states have faced unique challenges in terms 
of projecting authority over its territory and have consequently also had difficulties in gaining the loyalty 
of its citizens (Englebert 2002). For example, while state building in other parts of the world has largely 
been an outcome of a fundamental need to wage war, this has most often not been the case in Africa. 
For that reason, African states have never had a direct security imperative to physically control both the 
hinterland and the center. In turn, this has had significant repercussions for the state-building process 
(Bates 2008).  
Generally, African states have thus been argued to lack empirical statehood. That is, despite being de 
jure states, they have in many cases been argued to lack sufficient authority to govern a territory and its 
population (Jackson 1992). This is in turn often derived from the colonial origins of state building, which 
was largely an exogenous process giving rise to states lacking legitimacy (Englebert 2002). Independent 
states hence inherited colonial structures with a number of competing claims to power, advanced by 
multiple actors with conflicting interests inhabiting the same territory (Migdal 1988). Yet, as argued by 
Migdal (2001), the fact that no actor has the monopoly of violence – or of social control – does not 
necessarily imply that people are not governed. In fact, the overall sum of authority in society might still 
be high but fragmented. Hence, in such a context, the state is perceived of as one actor among many, 
involved in struggles over who has the right to make the number of rules that structure people’s behavior. 
Not complying with the state’s rules is hence not only personal deviance but could rather reflect a conflict 






64). Exploring the factors associated with willingness to share information with the state is thus partic-
ularly interesting in the context of frail states, where information sharing is even more needed than 
elsewhere.  
We focus on people’s willingness to assists authorities in providing intelligence in policing. This is related, 
but not synonymous, to the use of criminal informants – where ‘snitches’ or ‘rats’ are slurs used to brand 
such actors – that receive compensation or pressure from law enforcement to tell about illegal activities 
(Miller 2011). There are also examples with broader relevance of when citizens act as the ‘eyes and ears’ 
of the police, by providing various forms of intelligence. For example, situations of searching for ab-
ducted children, or telling authorities of ongoing burglaries, are both parts of a standard toolkit, where 
citizens’ information is used to assist police (Schreurs et al. 2018).  
The term ‘community policing’ has for the last decades been used in public rhetoric to signal an approach 
to crime fighting that contrast older strategies (Terpstra 2010). As Gill et al. (2014) notes, community 
policing focuses on the cooperation between the police and the community. While being a broad notion 
with numerous definitions, a central element of this approach is citizen involvement (Skogan 2006). A 
central tenet of these various conceptualizations is that citizens do have a role to play, in providing 
intelligence of future and historical acts of crime (Van der Land et al. 2014). In the words of Schreurs et 
al. (2018): “One reason for the increased attention to the use of citizen capital in the police domain is 
that the police simply do not have the resources to be constantly present. At the same time, citizens 
know the ins and outs of their neighborhood; they know where problems lie, and when something sus-
picious is going on” (p. 776).  
For policy makers, it is of course useful to understand the extent to which citizens are interested in 
engaging in such activities and the factors determining variation in such attitudes. The importance of 
gaining information from citizens, however, illustrates the predicament of frail rulers: on the one hand, 
such governments lack capacity to monitor their citizens and therefore need the help of their subjects to 
assist in policing. At the same time, agents employed in state authorities in such settings often engage in 
behavior outside of their assigned duties. Therefore, officials in weak states are – for these and other 
more fundamental reasons – not necessarily considered the most legitimate and effective authority in the 
eyes of the citizenry, which potentially reduces the willingness of citizens to share crucial information. 
The case of poaching in African countries 
The importance of securing constituent cooperation and gaining information from communities has 
been one of the core motivations for implementing community based natural resource management in 
many parts of the world. For such programs, an argument has been that resident persons possess local 
knowledge to a larger extent than state agencies. Similarly, strategies to combat poaching have included 
attempts to secure participation of local communities (Cooney et al. 2017; Massé et al. 2017). For in-
stance, ethnographic studies on the work of Mozambican rangers, suggests that locals are essential in 
intelligence collection (Massé et al. 2020). A commonly used tool in such approaches include ‘anti-poach-
ing hotlines’ (Green 2016), where communities can report suspected wildlife crime. 
Locals may serve an important purpose since poaching often takes place in areas that are vast and ex-
pensive to patrol. Consider, for instance that Kruger – the part of GLTP situated in South Africa – is 






patrolled by only 400 rangers (Bradtke 2017). While this number is likely an estimate, it reflects the 
challenge authorities of such parks face. A second reason why authorities might want to include locals 
in their strategies to address poaching is because of locals’ unique position, as these activities are generally 
reliant on some affiliation to the community (Lotter and Clark 2014). Poachers often possess a local 
knowledge or, in the case of out-of-town poaching crews, they tend to rely on logistical assistance from 
members of the community (Hübschle 2016). For instance, one of the ‘best practices’ in the training 
material for field-rangers – issued by the organization International Rangers Federation – is the goal of 
maximizing the role locals can play in resolving poaching cases. This document refers for instance to 
experiences from study of a Tanzanian protected area where a majority of arrests was due to information 
received by community informants (Lotter et al. 2016).  
Explaining willingness to assist in policing poaching 
The following sections outline five dimensions that we argue can contribute to explain the variation that 
exists in people’s tendency to share information and to report suspicious activities about poaching to 
state authorities.  
The first line of reasoning is about the relational aspect between citizens and state officials in a park. 
Trust has been shown to work as an informal institution that shapes human interaction and, as such, 
influences the prospects for collective action and cooperation (Denzau and North 2000). Of particular 
importance here is the vertical dimension, i.e., the trust citizens have in that the state will enforce regu-
lations impartially and to act as an effective and legitimate third party (Ostrom 1990). This goes especially 
for the agents employed to carry out such tasks in practice, such as rangers. The impartiality (and hence 
lack of corruption) of order institutions – e.g., the police and other legal institutions – is argued to be of 
particular importance since the function of those institutions is to detect and punish free riders and 
people who renege on contracts (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). If residents do not trust officials responsible 
for combatting poaching, there is potentially little motivation to provide these actors with information. 
Perceiving rangers as turning a blind eye (Massé et al. 2017) or even colluding with poachers (Sundström 
2015; Sundström 2016) could make the rational citizen refrain from speaking out on illegal acts in the 
area. Because they might risk that confidential information reaches poachers, telling on them might – 
with the present of corrupt officials – even give rise to situations described with the proverb of ‘snitches 
get stiches.’ From the above theoretical discussion, we derive the following hypothesis: 
H1: The more park rangers are seen as trustworthy and uncorrupt, the higher is people’s propensity to share information 
about poachers to state authorities.  
A second line of reasoning refers to moral beliefs among people. There are several theoretical models 
emphasizing normative factors as key determinants for various forms of rule compliance and collective 
action, implying that people will only be willing to follow laws if they are perceived as fair and justified. 
For example, Gezelius (2004) argues that not sharing information about rule transgressions can be a 
function of a conviction that the rules are immoral. This is also supported by Schreurs et al. (2018) 
finding that people’s morality is an oft-mentioned factor in the broader literature that focuses on people’s 
reasons to assist police in resolving crimes. Based on this, we suggest that whether a person see rule 






mine people’s propensity to share information to authorities – an action that plausibly could help au-
thorities towards reaching a goal that align with a person’s moral conviction. We therefore expect the 
following relationship: 
H2: The more people hold moral beliefs about duties to comply with park rules and that poaching is morally wrong, the 
more likely that they will be willing to share information about poachers to state authorities. 
The third line of reasoning pertains to whether people are directly or indirectly complicit in poaching 
themselves. We here rest on the assumption that people’s own involvement in illegal activities should 
affect their tendency to involve law enforcement. Besides this direct link to poaching, there might also 
be an indirect association to rule violations. It is possible that people who have social relations with 
poachers and might have partaken in actions such as occasional hunting themselves, or eaten bushmeat 
that others have hunted by illegal means, will have a larger obstacle to pass before turning to authorities 
in these matters. This results in the following hypothesis:   
H3: The more people are being directly and indirectly involved in violations of park rules the lesser their propensity to share 
information about poachers to state authorities. 
A fourth line of reasoning builds upon people’s incentives and material stakes in preserving wildlife. A 
number of theoretical accounts emphasizes the importance of instrumental factors in which the willing-
ness of rational individuals to cooperate with state officials depends on whether the benefits anticipated 
from following the rules outweigh the costs. This conceptualization also builds on the logic that people 
will only cooperate if they fear being punished and faced with hard sanctions if they do not (Keane et al. 
2008). Reasonably, there are several factors at play here. Park rules might give some people economic 
advantages, such as providing payments to compensate for hunting bans. In contrast, rules that serve to 
conserve wildlife could stand in conflict with economic factors for others, such as having your crops 
destroyed by large mammals. A large vein of research on human-wildlife conflicts documents that locals 
living near protected areas occasionally suffer property damage from large mammals – or even physical 
damage of people in the community – which can affect their views on conservation (Nicole 2018). There 
is also research on revengeful killings and retaliatory poaching after material destruction caused by wild 
animals (Moreto 2019). This leads us to pose the following expectation:    
H4: The higher the economic benefits from preserving wildlife are, the higher the propensity to share information about 
poachers to state authorities. 
A fifth line of reasoning holds that people’s concern about the problem, e.g., whether or not people 
perceive wildlife to be threatened, should be of importance. As claimed by López-Hoffman et al. (2006), 
perceptions of how threatened a resource is may also differ between people in the same community: 
“Local knowledge is heterogeneous; often, not all members of the given area or community have the 
same ecological knowledge” (p. 1). Relatedly, studies in psychology have suggested, in general, that pro-
environmental intent and behavior is affected by individual environmental concern and perceptions of 
how threatened the environment is (cf. Steg and Vlek 2009). Taken together we should expect that:  







3. Methods and data 
The case of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park  
The GLTP is part of a transfrontier conservation area (TFCA) shared by Mozambique, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe (see Figure 1). The TFCA was formally established in 2000 when the countries agreed 
on a common treaty and then, in 2002, a new treaty was signed establishing the GLTP, recognizing the 
core protected areas of the region. The park covers an area of about 35,000 square kilometers and in-
cludes the Kruger National Park in South Africa, Gonareshou National Park in Zimbabwe, and Limpopo 
National Park in Mozambique.  
There is a large number of people residing both within an adjacent to the GLTP which in turn increases 
the risk of human-wildlife conflict. Poaching is in fact a salient challenge in the region where open po-
litical borders that facilitate poachers’ cross-border movements as well as corruption and lack of policy 
harmonization all have been identified as potential drivers (SADC 2015; Linell et al. 2019). The multiple 
reasons for why poaching is still widespread in the GLTP are complex and also vary by the type of actors 
involved. Besides subsistence poaching (Ntuli et al. 2021), the area is plagued by poaching syndicates, 
notably organized Mozambican crime networks that target rhinos. As Lubbe (2015) discusses, two as-
pects are certainly crucial here. First, poverty is widespread in the area. Being in dire need of an income 
not only might push people to violate laws to secure a livelihood, but also tend to make people into ‘soft 
targets’ as recruits for syndicates. A second feature is that the creation of protected areas in the region 
has been characterized by dispossession of locals from their ancestral land which has made it difficult to 
establish a cooperative relationship between officials and communities (Lunstrum 2013; ‘t Sas-Rolfes 
2017; Hübschle 2017 ).  
In addition, it is far from certain that state officials in these parks behave in accordance with assigned 
duties. The efforts of these officials are sometimes heroic – think of the ranger who in 2019 singlehand-
edly arrested five heavily armed rhino poachers in the Kruger National Park (SA-People 2019). People 
might very well recognize that such efforts are applaudable. Yet, there are also numerous examples of 
wrongdoings in this sector, which are likely to shape people’s perceptions of the rangers. One illustration 
includes that authorities, also in the South African Kruger in 2019, arrested a former corporal of the 
SanParks ranger services on charges of poaching (Sunday Times 2019). Similar cases of rangers being 
arrested with heavy arms, poaching equipment and testimonies of illicit payments has been surfacing in 
news from Mozambique (Mail & Guardian 2013) and, more recently, in Zimbabwe (All Africa 2020). To 
add even further complexity, accounts also describe how actors in poaching networks are skilled in re-
warding those locals that enable poaching, or making communities into accomplices by indirectly sup-
porting their activities. Hübschle’s (2016) work illustrates this strategy, as she describes what this might 
look like: “certain kingpins ‘throw a village party’ by slaughtering a few cows and providing traditional 
beer upon the return of a successful poaching expedition to the Kruger National Park.” Yet another 
significant factor include that the area is located relatively far from the respective countries’ political 








FIGURE 1. THE GREAT LIMPOPO TRANSFRONTIER PARK (GLTP) 
 
Source: Lunstrum (2013). 
 
These characteristics makes the GLTP an interesting setting. It is far from certain that GLTP authorities’ 
demand for intelligence from locals is met with success. The case hence constitutes a ‘hard’ case in terms 
of investigating the motives behind sharing information with state officials since such information shar-
ing is not to be expected by default in this context. 
The survey 
The survey – focusing on residents’ willingness to comply with rules as well as their perceptions about 
poaching – was completed through face-to-face interviews between May 2017 and June 2018 and in-
cludes 2282 respondents (769 from Zimbabwe, 582 from South Africa and 931 from Mozambique). 
Sampling was done in two phases. First, simple random sampling was applied to communities with help 
from local leadership, government officials, and resource persons who assisted in identifying their juris-
dictions. This procedure ensured that chiefs and local authorities did not influence the sampling by rec-
ommending some villages over others. Using this procedure, 11 out of 29 communities located near 
Gonarezhou National Park in Chiredzi district were chosen. These were all identified by the RDC in 
Zimbabwe. In South Africa, the local chief identified a full sample of five villages closely situated to 
Kruger National Park. On the Mozambican side, local authorities helped us to purposefully select three 






selected 21 villages. The households and communities were chosen to represent the different segments 
of the population found in the GLTP from poor rural households and communities found in Mozam-
bique and Zimbabwe to relatively wealthier peri-urban households and communities found on the South 
Africa side. The sampling process in all communities followed the following procedure. Upon entering 
a village, enumerators randomly selected a starting point and direction by flipping a coin and tossing a 
dice simultaneously. Starting with a random household on the list, the next respondent was chosen after 
every n household where n is the sampling interval calculated as the total number of households in the 
community divided by the required sample size for that community. The procedure continued until the 
required number of respondents was achieved. We recruited university students to assist with data col-
lection, whom were trained for two days. A pilot round was conducted on the third day in one village 
before the main data collection started in each country.  
Operationalizations 
The dependent variable in this study – i.e., willingness to share information with state officials – is cap-
tured by four survey items. We use three questions that were posed after the general query: “How willing 
would you be to participate in the following activities to reduce poaching.” These items focused on; 
“Help park rangers in their surveillance by telling them of suspicious activities”, “Tell authorities about 
poachers’ activities” and “Tell authorities about poachers’ activities, even though you know these peo-
ple”. Answers ranged from ’Not at all willing’ (1) to ’Very willing’ (5). We also use an item asking: “To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements?: You would tell authorities if you had infor-
mation that could send a poacher in front of the legal system to face sanctions.” Answers spanned from 
‘Disagree completely’ (1) to ‘Agree completely’ (5). From these four questions we created a composite 
index, with all parts of equal weight. This aggregate construct shows high scale reliability and has a 
Cronbach's alpha of 0.91, thus indicating satisfactory internal consistency.1   
To operationalize the five dimensions that we posed expectations about, we rely on several survey items. 
As described in Table 1, these items measure different aspects of each dimension, suitable for this local 
context and type of problem. We made sure to use items that capture the full complexity of these di-
mensions, but also not to use items that measure the same feature (i.e. are synonymous or antonymous). 
As an example, it is likely that few people that are afraid of rangers trust these actors. However, not all 
people that distrust rangers are necessarily afraid of them. The descriptive statistics for each variable – 
that is, their univariate distribution – is reported in Table 1.   
  
                                                     
 
1 We constructed an alternatively specified index with a fifth item included. This question read: “To what extent 
do you agree with the following statements?: It is sometimes justified to harbor a poacher in your house.”  
Answers spanned from to ‘Agree completely’ (1) to ‘Disagree completely’ (5). While it captures our concept, 






TABLE 1. CODING AND DISTRIBUTIONS OF VARIABLES 
Variables Coding Min Max Mean N 
Dependent variable 
Composite index of willingness to assist authorities Aggregate measure of 
four items 
4 20 14,74 2282 
Relational factors 
To what extent do you agree with the following state-
ments regarding rangers enforcing rules? ... ‘You are 
afraid of them’ 
1 (disagree completely) 
to 5 (agree completely) 
1 5 2.81 2281 
To what extent do you think that the following groups 
or persons can be trusted? … ‘The rangers in this 
country enforcing rules’  
1 (not at all) to 4 (to a 
great extent) 
1 4 2.96 2278 
If you are found by rangers after conducting illegal 
hunting, how likely is it that you could give them a 
gift to make them refrain from carrying out sanctions? 
1 (not at all likely) to 4 
(very likely) 
1 4 1.57 2282 
Moral factors 
There is a moral obligation to comply with the rules 
governing the park2 
1 (disagree completely) 
to 5 (agree completely) 
1 5 3.81 2279 
Poaching for subsistence use is morally wrong 1 (disagree completely) 
to 5 (agree completely) 
1 5 3.64 2282 
Most people in my community believe poaching is 
morally wrong 
1 (disagree completely) 
to 5 (agree completely) 
1 5 4.03 2282 
Complicity 
In general, to what extent do you obey the regulations 
of the park? 
1 (not at all) to 4 (to a 
complete extent) 
0 4 3.67 2281 
How many impalas or inyalas have you killed in the 
last year?  
Binary recode, 0 = None 
1 = one and above 
0 1 0.02 2282 
How many times have you eaten bushmeat within the 
last year?  
Binary recode, 0 = None 
1 = one and above 
0 1 0.27 2282 
Instrumental factors 
Does the rules from Great Limpopo Trans-frontier 
Park (“the park”) benefit you, for instance by gener-
ating income or employment? 
0 (no) to 1 (yes) 0 1 0.29 2282 
Do you consider yourself or anyone else in the house-
hold to be a hunter? 
0 (no) to 1 (yes) 0 1 0.09 2282 
Has your property or any person you know been dam-
aged by wildlife? 
0 (no) to 1 (yes) 0 1 0.75 2282 
Concern and salience 
In recent time, the overall threats to wildlife and re-
sources have increased 
1 (disagree completely) 
to 5 (agree completely) 
1 5 2.83 2274 
Wildlife and nature in the area of the park is in risk of 
being depleted 
1 (disagree completely) 
to 5 (agree completely) 
1 5 2.77 2277 
Socioeconomic variables 
Gender 0 (female) 1 (male) 0 1 0.33 2281 
Years of age Numerical 17 92 42.42 2282 
Years of education Numerical 0 17 5.39 2267 
Days in year without food Numerical 0 100 2.43 2282 
                                                     
 
2 The respondent is first asked: ”To what extent do you agree with the following statements” This is the case with all items 







A problem in survey research is that respondents might systematically answer to “avoid embarrassment 
and project a favorable image to others” (Fisher 1993, p. 303). From what we can tell, there are indica-
tions that our survey still managed to capture people’s attitudes, also when this depicts them as less 
sympathetic in the eyes of the interviewer. Several of the items depict a large portion of people as en-
gaging in illegal behavior themselves and holding attitudes that violate perceptions of acceptable behav-
ior. Some illustrations include that over 13 % of respondents stated ‘Not at all’ or ‘To a limited extent’ 
to the question on whether they obey the regulations of the park. More than a fourth of respondents 
(28%) state that they know a poacher. Also, in the four items constituting our dependent variable, a large 
portion of people opted for the two least collaborative response (ranging from 18 to 24%). 
Models 
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate our models. The dependent variable is quite 
evenly distributed, but also somewhat positively skewed as people are generally willing to assist authori-
ties (Table A1 in the appendix). We ran a number of diagnostic tests on these models. In terms of 
multicollinearity, our independent variables do not have problematic internal correlations (i.e. the VIF-
values are below common thresholds). We include country dummies, as such fixed effects (FE) models 
hold national factors constant that are not primarily of interest in this analysis. The models control for 
four socio-economic factors; gender, age, years of education and a measure of how many days for a year 
a person has gone to bed without food.  
As an extension of our analysis, we test our model on a split sample of respondents; focusing on those 
that answer ‘yes’ to the question ‘Do you know any person who has been involved in poaching in the 
park?’. Because these individuals might have a different view on sharing information about poaching, we 
are interested to see if the same factors predict attitudes among this group. We also run the models on 
our full sample with an altered version of the dependent variable (see footnote 2). This index, consisting 
of five items instead of four, serves to show that this alternative specification does not point to substan-
tively different findings. Finally, and as a further robustness test, we analyze two of the items in our 
composite dependent variable in detail. Poaching is sometimes seen as ‘folk crime’ (Filteau 2012) and 
locals might differentiate in their attitudes between subsistence poaching and commercial poaching. It is 
therefore relevant to see if willingness to assist authorities differ when we ask if people are willing to ‘tell 
authorities about poachers’ activities’ in general compared to the item with the ending ‘even though you 
know these people.’ We use ordered logistic regression techniques for those models, because these single 
items have categorical responses. There are pitfalls when comparing such models (Mood 2010) and we 









To describe our results, we proceed stepwise and display the findings as reported in the models one to 
six in Table 2. Under the conceptual heading of relational factors, all three items are statistically signifi-
cant across the different specifications. They are also displaying the expected directions, meaning that 
being afraid of rangers, not trusting rangers and seeing rangers as likely to accept and act on bribes, is 
associated with a statistically significant decrease in our outcome measure. In the full estimation, model 
six, the three items have a coefficient size ranging from 0.22 to 0.35. The coefficient for being afraid of 
rangers is the smaller one of these, but it is on the other hand a measure with five responses (the other 
two having four response alternatives). When the three items are introduced in model one, they increase 
the adjusted R-squared (compared with model zero, only having two country dummies included) with a 
number suggesting that these factors alone explain about four percent of the total variance in willingness 
to assist authorities with information. 
The results also suggest that normative factors matter. The three items that gauge the extent to which 
people (a) see that there are moral obligations to comply, (b) view subsistence poaching as morally wrong 
and (c) believe that people generally see poaching as morally wrong have positive coefficients, at the 
0.001 level (99.9%). The full model suggests that a change in one of the response categories corresponds 
with a mean shift in willingness to assist authorities by roughly 0.5 to 0.6 scale steps (all three items have 
five response categories). Model three indicate that inserting these items resulted in increasing the ex-
plained variance and, judging by the R-squared in Model three, that these factors account for some seven 
percent of the observed variance in willingness to assist authorities.  
In contrast, the items that measure if people are directly or indirectly complicit in poaching, does not 
seem to explain much of the differences among respondents that we see in willingness to provide intel-
ligence to authorities. As evident in the full model, only one item, the extent to which people state that 
they obey with park regulations, is statistically significant (p < 0.001) and it is associated with our de-
pendent variable in the expected direction. However, its substantive effect cannot be considered to be 
very large (0.23) and the three items only has a small effect on the adjusted R-squared. While the items 
of whether a respondent has killed wild animals or eaten bushmeat have coefficients in the negative 
direction that we hypothesized, they are not significant in our full model. Regarding the last two dimen-
sions, we find little explained variance. For the set of instrumental factors, two items – the binary ones 
of whether or not a person benefits from the GLTP and whether someone in the household is a hunter 
– are statistically significant (95% level). However, we observe no change in the adjusted R-square when 
the three items are included (model four). This is also generally the case for the last dimension, focusing 
on the salience of the effects from poaching. The questions that tap on people’s perceptions of wildlife 
as being threatened or whether park resources risks being depleted are not showing a significant associ-
ation with our outcome measure. When we add our four controls for socio-economic factors, our main 
relationships do not change substantively (model six). In this full specification, whether we account for 
people’s gender, their age, their years of education and the number of days in a year they have gone to 
bed without food, the relationships observed in the prior models remain virtually unchanged. We arrive 
at an adjusted R-squared of 0.19, which would suggest (comparing models five and six) that these soci-
oeconomic factors alone can explain about one percent of the variance in attitudes towards helping 






When we have a closer look at the group saying that they know a poacher, this analysis reflects the trends 
reported above in most aspects but also adds some nuance (Table 3). First of all, it should be noted that 
the mean score on our composite outcome measure, the dependent variable, is very similar in the groups 
of those answering ‘no’ and ‘yes’ (a mean of 14,8 and 14,4 respectively). Looking at the predictor varia-
bles, it seems that the associations are quite similar. The items capturing the relational dimension again 
have the direction as expected and two of them – the extent to which people are afraid of rangers and 
trust these actors – are significant in the full model (in this sub-sample, the coefficient of corruption 
perceptions is not significant in the final specification). The items gauging the normative dimension 
contribute to the largest part of the explained variance in the full model. The size of the significant 
coefficients that relate to moral is somewhat larger than in the full sample and these items seem to explain 
about nine percent of the variation in our dependent variable (the difference in adjusted R squared be-
tween models one and two, in Table 3). In detail, it is the two items of a moral obligation to comply and 
seeing subsistence poaching as morally wrong that are significant (at the 0.001 level). A third trend is that 
the other dimensions does not explain much of the observed variance in people’s willingness to assist 
authorities in information sharing. 
As evident from table A1 in the Appendix, the models of the full sample where we use a slightly altered 
index (consisting of five items) behaves almost identical to our main model. The variables that are sig-
nificant are the same ones (as are their direction) and their sizes are on par between these full models. 
Finally, table A2 in the Appendix reports how the full models differ when we study variation in the item 
of ‘tell authorities about poachers’ activities’ in general compared to the item with the addition ‘…even 
though you know these people.’ The two models are largely identical and these results seem to point to 






TABLE 2. WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST AUTHORITIES TO TELL ON POACHERS  
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relational factors        
Afraid of rangers  -0.256*** -0.245*** -0.238*** -0.233*** -0.237*** -0.217*** 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in rangers  0.431*** 0.343*** 0.323*** 0.308*** 0.318*** 0.308*** 
  (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Rangers accept gifts  -0.738*** -0.408*** -0.358*** -0.345*** -0.346*** -0.352*** 
  (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Normative factors        
Moral obligation to comply   0.680*** 0.599*** 0.589*** 0.592*** 0.589*** 
   (0.094) (0.097) (0.097) (0.103) (0.097) 
Subsistence poaching is 
wrong 
  0.625*** 0.593*** 0.580*** 0.581*** 0.578*** 
   (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Community see poaching as 
wrong 
  0.523*** 0.504*** 0.489*** 0.512*** 0.508*** 
   (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
Complicity        
Obeys regulations    0.319*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.308*** 
    (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Have killed impalas/inyalas    -0.289 -0.034 -0.063 -0.095 
    (0.588) (0.598) (0.599) (0.599) 
Have eaten bushmeat    -0.017 -0.017 0.005 0.035 
    (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.199) 
Instrumental factors         
Rules give benefits     0.391* 0.394* 0.385* 
     (0.181) (0.182) (0.181) 
Hunter household     -0.658* -0.656* -0.694* 
     (0.299) (0.299) (0.298) 
Experienced wildlife damage     -0.020 -0.042 -0.078 
     (0.192) (0.193) (0.193) 
Concern and salience        
Threats to wildlife increased      0.091 0.089 
      (0.082) (0.082) 
Park resources risks deple-
tion 
     0.032 0.026 
      (0.081) (0.081) 
Socio-economic controls       yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Intercept 13.599 14.130*** 7.073*** 6.403*** 6.598*** 6.181*** 5.939*** 
 (0.132) (0.348) (0.638) (0.664) (0.709) (0.762) (0.75) 
N 2247 2247 2247 2247 2247 2247 2247 
adj. R2 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
Comment: OLS regression (unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses). The dependent 







TABLE 3. WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST AUTHORITIES TO TELL ON POACHERS: THOSE KNOWING A POACHER 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relational factors        
Afraid of rangers  -0.312** -0.311** -0.322** -0.277* -0.279* -0.261* 
  (0.120) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) 
Trust in rangers  0.582*** 0.585*** 0.570*** 0.573*** 0.572*** 0.547*** 
  (0.165) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.159) 
Rangers accept gifts  -0.664*** -0.283 -0.240 -0.235 -0.246 -0.252 
  (0.165) (0.163) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) (0.165) 
Normative factors        
Moral obligation to comply   0.956*** 0.860*** 0.842*** 0.831*** 0.839*** 
   (0.161) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) 
Subsistence poaching is 
wrong 
  0.702*** 0.667*** 0.639*** 0.643*** 0.633*** 
   (0.138) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
Community see poaching as 
wrong 
  0.291 0.284 0.251 0.269 0.270 
   (0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.169)  (0.170)  
Complicity        
Obeys regulations    0.367* 0.306 0.302 0.317 
    (0.162) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) 
Have killed impalas/inyalas    -0.948 -0.280 -0.201 -0.052 
    (0.882) (0.907) (0.909) (0.914) 
Have eaten bushmeat    0.246 0.353 0.330 0.415 
    (0.342) (0.346) (0.349) (0.350) 
Instrumental factors         
Rules give benefits     0.359 0.356 0.418 
     (0.360) (0.360) (0.360) 
Hunter household     -1.365** -1.352** -1.335** 
     (0.481) (0.478) (0.483) 
Experienced wildlife damage     0.060 0.061 0.077 
     (0.439) (0.440) (0.440) 
Concern and salience        
Threats to wildlife increased      -0.145 -0.135 
      (0.155) (0.155) 
Park resources risks deple-
tion 
     0.150 0.123 
      (0.153) (0.153) 
Socio-economic controls       yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Intercept 12.459*** 12.920*** 5.482*** 4.674*** 5.191*** 5.203*** 3.552*** 
 (0.271) (0.739) (1.183) (1.230) (1.360) (1.439)  (1.564)  
N 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 
adj. R2 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27  0.28 
Comment: OLS regression (unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses). The dependent 







The idea of ‘community policing’ has grown in interest over the last decades and focuses on the coop-
eration between the police (or other public authorities) and community members. However, any such 
system has at least one weak link, because it presupposes that the citizens really report criminal activities 
when being observed. This potential dilemma has motivated us to investigate why some individuals are 
keen on assisting official authorities while others are not and we chose the case of poaching in national 
parks in Southern Africa, which is a sector clearly suffering from faint capacities and resources.   
We hypothesized that the more park rangers are seen as trustworthy and uncorrupt, the higher is people’s 
propensity to share information about poachers to state authorities (H1). Consulting our results, this 
expectation is confirmed. Second, we suggested that the more people hold moral beliefs about duties to 
comply with park rules and that poaching is morally wrong, the more likely that they will be willing to 
share information about poachers to state authorities (H2). Also this hypothesis is confirmed. Thirdly, 
we hypothesized that the more people are involved in violations of park rules the lesser their propensity 
to share information about poachers to state authorities (H3). This expectation is only partially con-
firmed. Neither our fourth hypothesis – that the higher the economic benefits from preserving wildlife 
are, the higher the propensity to share information about poachers to state authorities (H4) – nor our 
final hypothesis – that the more people believe that wildlife is threatened, the more likely that they will 
share information about poachers (H5) – gain support.   
Based on these findings, we suggest that to make community policing initiatives in this sector more 
successful, policy should be more oriented towards changing how officials are perceived, i.e., authorities 
need to find ways to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of locals in order to increase their willingness to share 
crucial information. It will be difficult, to say the least, to make people change their views on the moral 
legitimacy of the rules governing this park. However, addressing this hurdle is likely crucial to make 
people more willing to assist in intelligence-sharing.  
 
6. Conclusions 
What makes citizens willing to share crucial intelligence with state officials? Given the trend in govern-
ance the last decades of an increased use of community-policing, understanding these processes are 
highly relevant. Citizens’ willingness to share important information says something about state capacity 
in general – both in terms of how to foster it and how to sustain it. In order to develop and test a number 
of potential theoretical mechanisms, the investigation focuses on the case of poaching of wildlife in the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) and uses unique survey data capturing residents’ propensity 
to report poaching activities to state authorities as well as factors that potentially can explain such be-
havior.  
More than speaking to issues of state capacity and compliance, the study also contributes to the problem 
of poaching. The loss of iconic wildlife species has in recent decades been unprecedented and in order 
to reverse this trend the involvement of communities in policing has been widely called for. Yet, in order 






shows that both relational and moral factors are of crucial importance. Citizens who do not trust rangers 
– or are afraid of them and perceive them as corruptible – are less willing to help authorities through 
sharing crucial information. Seeing poaching as condemnable also affects this outcome. Individuals’ ma-
terial stakes in conservation, and the extent to which people see wildlife as being threatened, however, 
do not substantively predict our outcome. We believe that these findings point to several directions for 
future research. For instance, there is a need to investigate which interventions that increase willingness 
to engage in information-sharing.  
The state’s ability to collect and manage information is a central feature of its efforts to foster and sustain 
social control. While some states almost exclusively rely on coercive means and derives constituent co-
operation either from deterrence, others emphasize that cooperative strategies promoting perceptions 
of inclusiveness, legitimacy, effectiveness, and fairness is what motivates constituent cooperation. The 
trend of exercising community policing is a clear example of such a cooperative strategy. Yet, these 
strategies might work best in tandem, and what this study shows is that policy makers should not be 
naïve in terms of expecting constituent cooperation. Instead, serious efforts need to be devoted to in-
crease citizens’ willingness to provide crucial information to state authorities. This article points to some 
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Appendix Table A1. Willingness to assist authorities to tell on poachers, 
slightly altered dependent variable  
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relational factors        
Afraid of rangers  -0.273*** -0.263*** -0.252*** -0.246*** -0.248*** -0.227*** 
  (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
Trust in rangers  0.452*** 0.349*** 0.322*** 0.305*** 0.311*** 0.301*** 
 
 
(0.084) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) 
Rangers accept gifts  -0.856*** -0.471*** -0.398*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.390*** 
  (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Normative factors        
Moral obligation to comply   0.781*** 0.665*** 0.652*** 0.654*** 0.650*** 
   (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101) 
Subsistence poaching is 
wrong 
  0.685*** 0.639*** 0.623*** 0.625*** 0.622*** 
   (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Community see poaching 
as wrong 
  0.640*** 0.614*** 0.596*** 0.606*** 0.602*** 
   (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.108) 
Complicity        
Obeys regulations    0.453*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 0.438*** 
    (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Have killed impalas/inya-
las 
   -0.508 -0.199 -0.229 -0.271 
    (0.619) (0.629) (0.630) (0.619) 
Have eaten bushmeat    -0.082 -0.037 -0.024 0.003 
    (0.203) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209) 
Instrumental factors         
Rules give benefits     0.403* 0.401* 0.389* 
     (0.190) (0.191) (0.191) 
Hunter household     -0.798* -0.797* -0.838* 
     (0.312) (0.314) (0.314) 
Experienced wildlife dam-
age 
    -0.041 -0.055 -0.093 
     (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) 
Concern and salience        
Threats to wildlife in-
creased 
     0.080 0.080 






Park resources risks deple-
tion 
     -0.010 -0.018 
      (0.086) (0.086) 
Socio-economic controls       yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Intercept 17.940*** 18.640*** 10.340*** 9.380*** 9.617*** 9.362*** 8.656*** 
 (0.141) (0.369) (0.670) (0.694) (0.741) (0.796) (0.860) 
N 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246 2246 
adj. R2 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Comment: OLS regression (unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses). The dependent 








Appendix Table A2. Willingness to assist authorities to tell on poachers 
whom you know 
 
 Willingness to tell on poachers  
Willingness to tell on poachers, even if 
you know them 
Relational factors   
Afraid of rangers 0.916** 0.960 
 (0.028) (0.029) 
Trust in rangers 1.096* 1.101* 
 (0.044) (0.043) 
Rangers accept gifts 0.872** 0.849*** 
 (0.043) (0.041) 
Normative factors   
Moral obligation to comply 1.385*** 1.280*** 
 (0.071) (0.064) 
Subsistence poaching is wrong 1.295*** 1.334*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Community see poaching as wrong 1.237*** 1.245*** 
 (0.067)  (0.066)  
Complicity   
Obeys regulations 1.145** 1.168*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) 
Have killed impalas/inyalas 1.176 1.174 
 (0.367) (0.363) 
Have eaten bushmeat 1.063 1.006 
 (0.109) (0.101) 
Instrumental factors    
Rules give benefits 1.287** 1.347*** 
 (0.122) (0.123) 
Hunter household 0.713* 0.812 
 (0.110) (0.123) 
Experienced wildlife damage 1.003 0.991 
 (0.100) (0.095) 
Concern and salience   
Threats to wildlife increased 1.068 0.984 
 (0.046) (0.041) 
Park resources risks depletion 0.987 1.053 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
Socio-economic controls yes yes 
Country FE yes yes 
Cut 1 1.021 1.156 
Cut 2 2.635 2.963 
Cut 3 3.032 3.415 
Cut 4 5.625 5.540 






N 2247 2247 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.05 
Comment: Ordered logistic regression models, odds ratios (std errors). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001 
 
